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THE DIRECTOR OF  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Officers

NIC 3017-83  
25 April 1983

MEMO FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM :   
Assistant NIO for Western Europe

SUBJECT : Chancellor Kohl's Europeanism

1. I should like to bring the attached cable to your attention because it illustrates an important facet of Kohl's thinking which, although positive from the US point of view, often seems overlooked in Washington: namely, that the Chancellor's commitment to the Alliance, on the one hand, and his interest in maintaining and improving Bonn's relations with East Germany, on the other, is accompanied by the "old-fashioned" motive of anchoring Germany ever more securely to European unity.

2.  was surprised by Kohl's linking the approval of the Genscher/Colombo plan to preventing a resurgence of pan-German nationalism. (The plan aims at a "European Act" that would mark a return to EC first principles as

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well as enhance political cooperation). But Kohl's reported remarks (see paragraph 5 of Copenhagen cable) themselves suggest a return to Adenauer's thinking rather than a "new argument" (paragraph 8).

3. There are many implications for the US from a Kohl stewardship that takes "Europe" as seriously as the Alliance and Ostpolitik -- not the least of which is Kohl's quite possible disappointment on the European front -- and I hope that the NIE on West Germany and the Alliance now being drafted will do justice to the questions raised.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

MSGNO 65 (STXX) N1A \*22/04/83\* \*12:13\*  
 ZCZC 17:08:53Z (ST)

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EZ1:

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(EXDIS)

EZ2:

BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC; LONDON FOR A/S BURT  
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
 TAGS: PREL, DA, GW, EEC  
 SUBJECT: SCHLUETER VISIT TO BONN: KOHL RAISES SPECTRE  
OF GERMAN NATIONALISM IN DISCUSSION OF GENSCHEF/COLOMBO  
PLAN  
 REF: (A) COPENHAGEN 2617 (NOTAL) (B) BONN 2792 (NOTAL)  
 (C) COPENHAGEN 650 (NOTAL)  
 1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.  
 2. BEGIN SUMMARY: ON APRIL 21 THE PRIME MINISTER'S  
 FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISOR, HENNING GOTTLIEB, BRIEFED  
 EMBOFF ON THE APRIL 19 VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER  
 SCHLUETER TO BONN, AT WHICH GOTTLIEB WAS PRESENT.  
 GOTTLIEB SAID THE MOST INTERESTING PART OF THE DISCUSSION  
WAS FRG CHANCELLOR KOHL'S ASSERTION THAT IF THERE  
IS NO VISIBLE PROGRESS TOWARD EUROPEAN INTEGRATION,  
E.G. AS REFLECTED IN THE GENSCHEF/COLOMBO PLAN,  
THERE IS A DANGER THAT THE GERMAN PEOPLE WILL  
TURV INWARD, I.E. AWAY FROM WESTERN EUROPE AND  
MOVE TOWARDS THEIR FELLOW GERMANS IN THE EAST.  
 GOTTLIEB SAID THAT DENMARK WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY  
 ISOLATED WITHIN THE EC IN ITS OPPOSITION TO THE  
 GENSCHEF/COLOMBO PLAN AND THAT HE EXPECTS THE

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 PRESENT GERMAN GOVERNMENT TO BE "MUCH LESS  
 PATIENT" WITH DANISH FOOTDRAGGING THAN WAS THE  
 SCHMIDT GOVERNMENT. GOTTLIEB ADDED HIS PERSONAL  
 SPECULATION THAT FOREIGN MINISTER ELLEMANN-JENSEN  
 WILL TAKE UP CONTACTS WITH THE OPPOSITION SOCIAL  
 DEMOCRATS IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE SOME FLEXIBILITY  
 VIS-A-VIS THE FRG DEMANDS. IN OUR VIEW, HOWEVER,  
THE DANISH GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE DIFFICULTY IN  
MAKING MUCH PROGRESS EVEN IF IT ATTEMPTS TO  
DO SO. END SUMMARY.

3. DURING HIS APRIL 19 VISIT TO BONN, SCHLUETER  
 DISCUSSED WITH KOHL THE GENSCHER/COLOMBO PLAN (THIS  
 TELEGRAM) AS WELL AS INF, CSCE AND EC/GREENLAND  
 (SEPTELS). VISIT WAS PART OF REGULAR EXCHANGE OF  
 VISITS BETWEEN WEST GERMAN AND DANISH HEADS OF  
 GOVERNMENT.

4. GOTTLIEB SAID THAT IN A TALK WHICH WAS DIFFICULT  
 FOR THE DANISH SIDE, FRG CHANCELLOR KOHL LAID A GREAT  
 DEAL OF WEIGHT ON THE NEED TO MOVE FORWARD WITH THE  
 GENSCHER/COLOMBO PLAN. GOTTLIEB SAID IT WAS A  
 SURPRISE TO THE DANES TO HEAR KOHL ARGUE IN FAVOR  
 OF THIS AS STRONGLY AS HE DID. GOTTLIEB ALSO  
 REFLECTED A VIEW WHICH WE HAVE HEARD FROM THE  
 FOREIGN MINISTRY HERE, I.E. THAT THE IMPRESSION  
 WAS THAT KOHL HAD LITTLE INTEREST IN THE  
 GENSCHER/COLOMBO PLAN AND WAS LEAVING IT ENTIRELY  
 TO GENSCHER. THE MFA'S EUROPEAN CORRESPONDENT  
 TOLD EMBOFF APRIL 21 THAT THE FRG CHANCELLERY  
 IN BONN HAD SPECIFICALLY TOLD THE DANISH  
 EMBASSY THAT THIS WAS THE CASE.

5. ACCORDING TO GOTTLIEB, KOHL TOLD SCHLUETER THAT IN  
 THE FRG THE WHOLE BURDEN OF "EUROPEANISM" NOW FALLS ON  
 THE CDU/CSU. HE SAID THAT THE WEST GERMAN SOCIAL  
 DEMOCRATIC PARTY (SPD) IS NO LONGER A "EUROPEAN" PARTY.  
 HE EXPRESSED CONCERN AT WHAT HE PORTRAYED AS THE DANGER  
 THAT, IF GERMANS ARE DISILLUSIONED WITH LACK OF  
 PROGRESS TOWARD EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, THEY MAY TURN  
 INCREASINGLY INWARD AND THAT ADENAUER'S MOMENTOUS  
 CHOICE TO TURN WEST RATHER THAN TO THE REST OF GERMANY  
 IN THE EAST MIGHT BE REEXAMINED. KOHL CITED IN THIS  
 REGARD AN INCREASED EMPHASIS ON GERMAN NATIONALISM  
 IN THE GDR.

5. EMBOFF SAID HE ASSUMED THAT DENMARK WAS NOT  
 ISOLATED IN ITS OPPOSITION TO THE GENSCHER/COLOMBO  
 PLAN, TO WHICH GOTTLIEB REPLIED THAT THIS ASSUMPTION,  
 WHILE ONCE CORRECT, WAS BECOMING LESS SO. HE SAID  
 THAT ON THE PROPOSAL FOR ENHANCED POWERS OF THE  
 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, IN THE SELECTION OF THE  
 EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND DETERMINATION OF EC POLICY,  
 FOR EXAMPLE, DENMARK WAS CLOSE TO BEING ISOLATED.  
 HE BELIEVES THAT THE GERMANS HAVE NOW PERSUADED  
 THE FRENCH TO FALL INTO LINE WITH SOMETHING THE  
 GERMANS CAN ACCEPT. GOTTLIEB SAID THAT IN HIS  
 EXDIS  
 BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC; LONDON FOR A/S BURT  
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TAGS: PREL, DA, GW, EEC

SUBJECT: SCHLUETER VISIT TO BONN: KOHL RAISES SPECTRE  
 VIEW, DENMARK MUST NOW UNDERSTAND THAT THERE IS  
 A POLITICAL PRICE FOR THE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES OF  
 BELONGING TO THE EC, I.E. THERE MUST BE STEPS  
 TOWARD POLITICAL INTEGRATION. HE SAID THE PRESENT  
 GOVERNMENT UNDERSTANDS THIS MUCH BETTER THAN THE  
 PREVIOUS DANISH SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (SDP)  
 GOVERNMENT DID BUT ANY CHANGE IN DANISH POLICY WILL  
 REQUIRE SDP CONSENT. HE ALSO BELIEVES THAT THE  
PRESENT GERMAN GOVERNMENT WILL BE "MUCH LESS  
"PATIENT" WITH DANISH FOOTDRAGGING THAN WAS THE  
PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT. AS PURELY PERSONAL SPECULATION,  
 HE SAID THAT FOREIGN MINISTER ELLEMANN-JENSEN  
 MAY TAKE UP DISCREET CONTACT WITH THE OPPOSITION  
 SDP IN AN EFFORT TO FIND A FORMULA ON THE  
 GENSCHER/COLOMBO PLAN WITH WHICH DENMARK CAN LIVE  
 AND THE GERMANS WILL BE SATISFIED.

7. COMMENT: THE PUBLIC TREATMENT OF THE KOHL/  
 SCHLUETER DISCUSSIONS ON THE GENSCHER/COLOMBO PLAN  
 MAKES NO MENTION OF KOHL'S "GERMAN NATIONALISM"  
 ARGUMENT BUT REPORTS KOHL AS EXPRESSING OPTIMISM  
 THAT THE EC COUNTRIES WOULD BE ABLE TO REACH  
 AGREEMENT ON CLOSER POLITICAL COOPERATION AT THE  
 EC SUMMIT AT STUTTGART IN JUNE AND SCHLUETER  
 AS MUCH LESS OPTIMISTIC. SCHLUETER REPORTEDLY  
SAID THAT DENMARK COULD NOT ACCEPT MANY OF THE  
ARRANGEMENTS OF THE PLAN, INCLUDING THE PROPOSALS  
TO EXPAND POWERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND  
TO LIMIT THE USE OF THE VETO RIGHT IN EC DECISIONS.  
 THE PRESS REPORTED SCHLUETER AS SAYING THAT HE COULD  
 NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT DENMARK WOULD  
 BLOCK AGREEMENT ON GREATER POLITICAL COOPERATION.

8. KOHL'S LINKAGE BETWEEN FURTHER STEPS TOWARDS  
 EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, AS A MEANS TO DEFLECT  
 GERMAN NATIONALISM, CAME AS A NEW ARGUMENT TO  
US, AS IT DID TO GOTTLIEB AND TO A FOREIGN  
MINISTRY CONTACT WHO DEALS EXTENSIVELY WITH THE  
GENSCHER/COLOMBO PLAN. IT WILL BE OF INTEREST  
 TO OBSERVE WHAT, IF ANYTHING, THE DANISH  
 GOVERNMENT SEEKS TO ACHIEVE AS A COMPROMISE  
 WITH THE SDP IN ORDER TO MEET GERMAN CONCERNS.  
 THUS FAR, THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS HAVE BEEN  
 PARTICULARLY STUBBORN IN REFUSING TO GIVE ANY  
 GROUND ON THE QUESTION OF THE GENSCHER/COLOMBO  
 PLAN AND WE EXPECT THAT THE MINORITY DANISH  
 GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE DIFFICULTY IN MOVING THEM.

9. WE TEND TO DOUBT THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER WILL  
 GO VERY FAR IN SEEKING TO MOVE THE SDP AT THIS  
 STAGE, BOTH BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT WANT  
 TO TAKE ON NEW PROBLEMS WITH THE OPPOSITION  
 AND BECAUSE THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S PERSONAL  
 RELATIONSHIP WITH THE OPPOSITION IS VERY POOR,  
 E.G. OVER THE EC SANCTIONS QUESTION.  
 HUGHES

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